

**SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN PAKISTAN: ITS CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS****Kulvinder Singh***Research Fellow, Deptt of Defence & National Security Studies, Panjab University**Chandigarh***Abstract**

Sectarianism is a real threat to Pakistan security. The history of sectarian conflict in Pakistan is as old as the existence of this country. Yet, the intensification of sectarian divide in Pakistan was observed during late 1970s and early 1980s because of domestic political changes and the implications of Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent adverse reaction in some Arab countries to the assumption of power by clergy operating from the holy city of Qom. During the military regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, which seized power on July 5, 1977 pursued a policy of 'Islamisation' resulting into the deepening of Sectarian divide between Shia and Sunnis. This paper attempts to analytically examine the dynamics of Sectarian conflict in Pakistan

Keywords: *Sectarianism, Shia, Sunni, Security, Conflict, Prophet, Islamisation*



Scholarly Research Journal's is licensed Based on a work at www.srjis.com

Introduction

Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon. It has been present in every society since the dawn of human history on the face of the earth. Nations entered into the new millennium with this unresolved issue. Pakistan is the main victims of sectarianism, which has been a major obstacle in the way of national integration. Before going into detail it is necessary to know what sectarianism? The word sectarianism is derived from "Sect", which means body of people has diverse views within same religion. Sectarianism means adherence to a particular Sect, especially in a bigoted or narrow minded manner. In sociological studies sect is the religious study which means a group split from the mainstream religion on the grounds of doctrine. The reason is that people of different ideologies stick to their beliefs and do not compromise with others. In sectarianism an individual or group adhere to a particular sect or religion develops the feeling of self righteousness and adopts an attitude of intolerance towards other sects of the same religion.

In Islam there are two sects Shia and Sunni. The Shia Sunni conflict is almost as old as Islam itself. The Sunnis form the vast majority in the world; the Shias are minority

except in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain, in Pakistan they constitute about 20 percent of the population. The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and over the nature of leadership in the Muslim community. The historic debate centred on whether to award leadership to a qualified, pious individual who would follow the customs of the Prophet or to transmit leadership exclusively through the Prophet's bloodline. The question was settled initially when community leaders elected a companion of the Prophet's named Abu Bakr to become the first Caliph (Leader of Islamic Faith). Although most Muslims accepted this decision, some supported the candidacy of Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet's cousin and the husband of his daughter, Fatima. Ali had played a prominent role during the Prophet's lifetime, but he lacked seniority within the Arabian tribal system and was bypassed.

This situation was unacceptable to some of Ali's followers, who considered Abu Bakr (632-34), and the two succeeding Caliphs Umar (634-44) and Uthman (644-56) to be illegitimate. Ali's followers believed that the Prophet Muhammad himself had named Ali as successor and that the status quo was a violation of divine order. A few of Ali's partisans orchestrated the murder of the third Caliph Uthman in 656 AD, and Ali was named Caliph (656-61). Ali in turn was assassinated in 661 AD, and his son Hussein and a small band of his family members and followers were killed by Yazidi's army in a brutal manner at Karbala (Iraq) in 680 AD. The Shia condemn the slaughter at Karbala, the Shia's mourn it every year during the month of Muharram. Ali's eldest son Hassan is also revered by Shiite Muslims in 670 AD, some of who claim he was poisoned by the Sunni Caliph Muawiyah.

Those who supported Ali's ascendancy became later known as "Shia," a word stemming from the term "Shi'at Ali" meaning "supporters" or "helpers of Ali". The Shia believe that after the prophet's death the office of interpreting the true faith and that of rulership belonged to his house which consisted of Ali and his descendants through Fatima, for the next eleven generations. Ali and his eleven descendants was Imam's, each of them appointed by his predecessor by god's grace, free of sin and incapable of error. The twelfth of these Imams's popularly known as Mehdi. In the Shia belief these twelve Imams partook of the qualities of god, and were divinely inspired in whatever they said and did. Others respected and accepted the legitimacy of his caliphate but opposed political succession based on bloodline to the Prophet. This group, who constituted the majority of Muslims, came to be known in time as "Sunni," meaning "followers of the Prophet's customs (Sunna)."

The caliphate declined as a religious and political institution after the thirteenth century, although the term “Caliph” continued to be used by some Muslim leaders until it was abolished in 1924 by Turkey’s first President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The decline and abolition of the caliphate became a powerful religious and political symbol to some Sunni Islamic activists during the nineteenth and twentieth century’s. These activists argued that leaders in the Islamic world had undermined the caliphate by abandoning the “true path” of Islam. Inspired by these figures, some contemporary Sunni extremists, such as Osama bin Laden and others, advocate the restoration of a new caliphate based on “pure” Islamic principles.

Recently, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, inventor and leader of IS (Islamic State), When his forces took over Mosul in the summer of 2014, he proclaimed himself Caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al - Quraishi al - Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet, he believe that Islam requires a caliphate, governance that’s in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet).

The Shia and Sunni sects are further divided into Sub-sects. Shia sects consist of, such as the Athna Ashari sect (the Twelvers) which dominate Pakistan's Shia minority. Smaller variations of the Shia school include the Ismailis (followers of the Aga Khan), Daudi Bohras (followers of Syedna Burhanuddin) and their rivals Sulemani Bohras (followers of Masood Salehbahi). The Shias share a devotion to shrines and saints with the Barelvis and other adherents of Sufi Islam. Sunnis can be divided into four broad categories: Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and revivalist, modernist movements like the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The first three Sunni sub-sects emerged as religious educational movements in the nineteenth century during British rule in India. The Deobandi named after a famous madrasah founded in Deobend, Uttar Pradesh, India in 1866. Ahl-e-Hadith (People of the Hadiths or traditions attributed to the Prophet) a branch of international Salafi (Salaf meaning forerunner or spiritual ancestor in Arabic) tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism and with particularly close links to Arabia dating back to the original foundations of this tendency in the 16th CE, which does not follow any of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Barelvis who called themselves the Ahl-e-Sunnat or people of teaching of Mohhammad and his Companions named after a Madrasah founded in 1880 in the town of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh, India. The JI came into being in the 1940s.

The Pakistani Shia community the second largest in the world after that of Iran has played an influential role in Muslim history and politics in the Indian sub continent. Before the arrival of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, the relationship between Pakistan's Shia and Sunni communities was mostly amicable. But Pakistan's fateful involvement in the Afghan - Soviet war of the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq's controversial 'Islamisation' policies, and a sense of Shia empowerment in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, had the combined effect of limiting the Shia's freedom to practice their religion and challenging their loyalty to Pakistan. Those developments also contributed to the persecution of many Shia at the hands of a number of militant anti-Shia organizations. A minority of Shia groups turned to violence in order to defend the community, engaging in tit-for-tat terror attacks against militant Sunni groups. Henceforth, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, Pakistan became the theatre for a proxy Saudi-Iran war.

These emerging Sectarian tensions within Pakistan were exacerbated by geopolitical trends. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shia Muslims, including those in Pakistan, felt empowered. At the same time, Pakistan-based Deobandi Sunni organisations and Madrassas began to receive weapons and funding from Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in order to provide support and training for Sunni Afghan fighters in the context of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, these fighters formed anti-Shia militant groups based in the southern districts of Pakistan's Punjab province. The region's poverty and chronic underdevelopment, political marginalisation, and stark contrast between wealthy Shia landlords and landless Sunni peasants made it the perfect recruiting ground for extremist sectarian groups.

The impact of the emergence of the Khomeini regime in 1979 in Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s on sectarian violence in Pakistan has generally been underestimated. It is no coincidence that the TNFJ, the main Shite party in Pakistan, was formed in 1979. When the Iran-Iraq war started, the Muslim world got divided into two camps and started funding their faith. As a result, enormous funds flowed, especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran, into Pakistan to support the various Sunni and Shia organizations and the madrassas run by them respectively, which were directly responsible for the growth of organized opposition and violence.

Islamic policies introduced by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq were also responsible for the growth of sectarian violence inside Pakistan. An in-depth analysis would reveal that these policies were cosmetic and peripheral, as they did not impinge on the bureaucratic-military

oligarchy or the feudal structure of the society. In fact, these policies were aimed at gaining legitimacy within Pakistan and were not meant to challenge the existing social and economic institutions. However, the Islamisation policies exerted a negative influence on the two communities. The Sunni religious parties led by JUI and JUP became active vis-a-vis the Shias, as they wanted the State to introduce the Sunnization of Pakistan, which the Shias feared. This made the Shias defensive and they started supporting the PPP. Besides, the changes made by Zia led to intense competition amongst the various Sunni groups, especially the Wahabis, Deobandis and Barelvis, as they wanted the State to enforce their own version of Islam, especially the Islamic laws, though they were united in their opposition to Shias. For example, in 1980 Zia imposed a Zakat (wealth tax) and Ushr (farming tax) and Hudood punishments accentuated Sectarian tension between the Shia and Sunnis. The Shia claim that their school of traditional legal thought namely Jafari fiqh is different in its perception from the Hanafi based Sunni fiqh. Shia demonstration in 1980 against Zakat had led to violence and bloodshed, forcing the General to repeal the ordinance as it pertained to Shia's, but also provoking the ire of hard-line Sunni organisations. Concerned by the Shia show of force, Sunni groups used the Shia refusal to pay an Islamic tax as an opportunity to brand members of the minority grouping as heretics and apostates, a narrative that still persists among extremist Deobandi Sunni groups. Islamic resurgent's under Zia brought to the surface the difference among various Sunnis sect too e.g Deobandi, Barelvi, Wahabi, Ahl-e-Hadith and so forth.

The Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafriya (TNFJ) was formed in 1979 to enforce the Jafri fiqh (The Jafari School of Shari'a is the law system of the Twelver Shia's Islam. Jafari is also used as another name for the Twelver Shia's, reflecting the integration between law and theology in the creed.), earlier in the same year General Zia had declared that the Hanafi fiqh would be enforced (The Hanafi School is one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence (fiqh). The other major schools of Sharia in Sunni Islam are Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. Hanafi is the fiqh with the largest number of followers among Sunni Muslims). The formation of TNFJ was the political response of the Shia community. In its early years it fought to get concessions such as exempting the Shia community from paying Zakat and Ushr. The TNFJ asked for recognition of Shia law by the courts, the formation of Shia Waqf Boards and separate Islamic studies courses for Shia students. Gen Zia eventually made concessions in each of these domains in what is known as "Islamabad Pact" in 1980. On 27 April 1981 the Ministry of Finance exempted Shias from the taxes.

The formation of the militant Sunni organisation Sipah-i-Sahaba (Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet), Pakistan (SSP) was formed in 1985 with the support of Zia after he had had meeting with Khomeini, and the militant Shia organisation Sipah-i-Mohammad (Soldiers of Prophet Mohammad), Pakistan (SMP) in 1993 was the main factor underlying the escalating conflict between the two communities. The SSP grew out of the Deobandi oriented Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and enjoyed state support. Zia himself was keen to use Sunni militants to resist Shia mobilization and contain Iranian influence in Pakistan. The SSP's primary goal was to have the Shias declared non-Muslim, just as the Ahmadi had been. Apart from the Sipah-i-Sahaba, other Sunni organizations like Sunni Tehrik were formed in Sindh. Later some SSP activists led by Riaz Basra organized the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), named after the founder of the SSP. The LeJ was more militant and has been banned. These organizations widened the sectarian divide and both groups started using violence against each other. The strength of these militant sectarian organizations increased in the 1980s and 90s, and they were only banned by General Musharraf in January 2002.

Factionalism within the religious parties and militant organizations deepened the sectarian divide. The Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI) got divided into two factions led by Fazl ur Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq and both factions attempted to build their foundations on anti-shia tenets with each trying to be more virulently anti-shia. Even the militant organizations on both sides (the SSP and the SMP) faced divisions, and these factions, devoid of effective leadership, were involved in arbitrary killings of the other community. Religious parties like the JUI provided indirect support to militant organizations. It is essential to understand that sectarian violence is largely limited to Punjab, especially in the district of Jhang, where the mainstream religious parties never enjoyed popular support. The Jamiat Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), which enjoys support at the popular level in Punjab belongs to the Barelvi faith and does not share the antagonism of the Deobandis and Wahabis towards the Shias. In fact, unlike the latter two, the JUP considers them to be Muslims and a part of the Islamic world.

Sectarian violence in Punjab was primarily due to Shia-Sunni economic, social and political relations. For example in Jhang, where sectarian violence is high, the Shia community forms the upper class, being landlords and enjoying political power; the majority Sunni community forms the lower stratum in the social, economic and political hierarchy. When the Sunni middle class grew, especially in the 1970s as a result of better education and remittances from the Gulf, they demanded their share of social and political status, which was

resisted by the Shias. Maulana Nawaz Jhangvi, assassinated in 1990 by Shia militants, formed the Sipah-i-Sahaba in Jhang in 1985, largely to fight the Shia landlords.

Pakistan's Afghan policy in the 1980s and 90s also aggravated sectarian violence inside the country. Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union in the 1980s resulted in the proliferation and easy availability of small arms in Pakistan. The emergence and subsequent growth of the Taliban in the 1990s and their support to Sunni organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen impinged directly on sectarian violence. The Sipah-i-Sahaba cadres were trained in Afghanistan and most of them fought the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Shias inside Pakistan.

Various Madrassas, especially in Punjab and Karachi, accentuated existing sectarian cleavage. Each Sunni schism (Deobandi, Brehlvi, Wahabi) and Shias ran their own madrassas for providing basic education. The curriculum was decided by the madaris. As a result, when sectarian fault lines got pronounced, a hate campaign was introduced vis-a-vis the other sect. Besides, the madrasas also provided manpower for these sectarian organizations, leading to sectarian engagements on the streets and dividing them further. The communities started defending their faith by protecting and supporting the offenders instead of condemning their violence. This support took the form of political, personal and financial patronage, which only accentuated the cycle of violence.

Sectarianism: Implications for Pakistan Security

Sectarian violence poses a grave threat to Pakistan's security and stability, primarily because conflict between mainstream religious communities threatens to involve and radicalise greater swathes of the Pakistani population than any other kind of militancy. This development would be in keeping with historical trends, whereby Shias and Barelvi Sunnis have responded to the attacks of extremist Deobandi groups by organising armed resistance. In the absence of a comprehensive state crackdown on militant sectarian groups, senior police officers in major cities such as Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar expect sectarian tensions to escalate across Pakistan. It is also likely that future sectarian violence, much like current violence in Balochistan, will increasingly be directed at ordinary citizens who are not members of militant groups as cycles of violence escalate, tit-for-tat killings will be less discriminatory in their targets. Judges, lawyers and others in the criminal justice system who are in a position to prosecute sectarian militants will also remain at high risk.

In addition to the widening scope of sectarian violence, Pakistan is likely to see sectarian organisations embrace broader mandates and launch attacks against the

Pakistani government, state security forces and Western targets. As described above, LeJ has already extended its anti-Shia mandate to participate in 'global jihad' as a result of its growing ties to the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda. Such a trend could seriously threaten Pakistan's overall security situation and destabilise the country to dangerous levels. Sectarian violence in Pakistan could also affect regional stability. Closer cooperation between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani LeJ in an effort to target Shia Hazaras could facilitate militant cooperation across the Durand Line and, in turn, complicate Pakistani-Indian ties, which are already threatened by the prospect of proxy warfare in Afghanistan. Continued attacks against Pakistan's Shia population could stoke tensions between Pakistan and Iran, threatening bilateral cooperation on a gas pipeline project and various counter-terrorism initiatives. There is also a danger of Pakistan once again becoming the battleground in a proxy clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly if Tehran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. There is already evidence of a regional dimension to Pakistan's sectarian crisis the grenade attack against Karachi's Saudi Arabian consulate in May 2011 was seen as an attempt to spark Sunni-Shia strife across the Middle East.

Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 1989-2016

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1989	67	18	102
1990	274	32	328
1991	180	47	263
1992	135	58	261
1993	90	39	247
1994	162	73	326
1995	88	59	189
1996	80	86	168
1997	103	193	219
1998	188	157	231
1999	103	86	189
2000	109	149	NA
2001	154	261	495
2002	63	121	257
2003	22	102	103
2004	19	187	619
2005	62	160	354
2006	38	201	349
2007	341	441	630
2008	97	306	505
2009	106	190	398
2010	57	509	1170
2011	30	203	297
2012	173	507	577
2013	131	558	987

2014	91	208	312
2015	53	276	327
2016	9	12	6
Total	3025	5239	9909

Data till June 5, 2016

Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal 2016 report, from to 1989 to 2016, there are a total of 3,025 sectarian violence incidents that occurred in which 5,239 people were killed and 9,909 people were injured. Pakistan is an Islamic state, but different religious political leader exploit religion for their own interest and divide the society into different sects. Islamic fundamental parties of Pakistan are also active in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The extremists got education from these Madrassa. These extremists also provide arms to Sunni operating in Pakistan killing Shia and as a retaliation Shia killing Sunni. Pakistan's soft image has been ruined due to the sectarian violence which has directly impact on the economy because foreigners refrain from investment in a destabilized state. Due to this unemployment are high even educated people did not find desired jobs. These people are exploited by extremists by providing money to them against the state. These things destabilize the country and are great threat to security. Initially sectarian conflicts were just confined to religious leaders, but now there is organized killing through suicide bombings on mosques and processions. Sectarian strife has created an alarming situation in the country. Almost all South Asian states including Pakistan continue to experience terrorism, sectarianism, religious, ethnic and political violence. The state is unable to provide security which resulted in the Privatization of Security where Small Arms and light weapon have become main tools of violence in ethnic and other internal conflicts by both state and non-state actors which threatened the life and prosperity of innocent people. In these conflicts numbers of casualties occurred which has threatened the very existence of life. Though, national security is paramount, but without human security it cannot be achieved. It is the responsibility of a state to protect its individuals from the evils of sectarian and ethnic conflicts.

Conclusion

Sectarianism in Pakistan is the most destabilizing factor for the country's political, social, religious, and security order. It has caused violence, disorder, and unrest in society. From last 30 years onwards, the society has seen number of suicide attacks, bomb blasts, assassination and terrorist act as the result of sectarian conflict. The government

sometimes exploits the sectarian issue for political purpose which divides the society on the basis of sects, which is a grave threat to the stability of country.

There are a variety of reasons why the state of Pakistan has failed to tackle the menace of sectarianism since the 1980s, when it emerged as a serious issue. First, military dictatorships institutionalized authoritarianism and discouraged the role of mainstream progressive and centrist political forces, with the result that religious extremist forces expanded their space and influence in the country. Sectarianism is a by product of religious activism and bigotry. Second, gradually the sectarian outfits developed organizational linkages with regional and global terrorist groups, rendering them more lethal as a result. Third, Pakistan's convoluted and misdirected regional policy, especially towards India and Afghanistan during the 1990s, provided a cover to sectarian militants. As in many previous instances, such groups supplied warriors for sabotage operations in Kashmir, in turn earning the gratitude of the country's security establishment. In some instances, this phenomenon remained active until recent years. Last, but not least, Pakistan's poor law enforcement capacity continues to seriously undermine its ability to confront sectarian militancy in the country. Even when police apprehend sectarian terrorists, they evade justice because of a failing criminal justice system. The combination of these factors has made this bad problem worse. It is important to mention that the Shia is not the only sect facing violence at the hands of extremists and terrorists in Pakistan. The Ahmadiya community, Hindus, Christians and even Barelvi Sunnis are all at the receiving end of this onslaught evidence that over the years, Pakistan has become an epicentre in a war of ideas that is taking place within the larger Muslim world.

References

- Abbas, Hassan, (2010): *Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, retrieved from, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/CTC-OP-Abbas-21-September.pdf>
- Ahmar, Moonis, *Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan*, retrieved from <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Moonis%20Ahmar-1.pdf>
- Ahmed, Khaled, (2012): *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its links to the Middle East*, New York, Oxford University Press
- Ahmed, Mustaq, (1985): *Pakistan at the Crossroads*, Karachi, Royal Book Co
- Amin, Tahir, (1988): *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan*, Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies
- Arif, Khalid. Mahmud., (1995): *Working with Zia Pakistan Power Politics 1977-1988*, Karachi, Oxford University Press

- Chandran, Suba, (2003): *Sectarian Violence in Pakistan*, IPCS Issue Brief, No-9, Aug, 2003, retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1614934887IB09-SubaChandran-SectarianViolencePak.pdf
- Hussain, Zahid, (2007): *Frontline Pakistan: the Struggle with Militant Islam*, London, I. B. Tauris
- IDSAs Task Force Report, (2010): *Whither Pakistan? Growing Instability and Implication for India*, New Delhi, IDSA Publisher
- International Crisis Group, (2005): *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, Asia Report No-95, 18 April 2005, retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan.ashx
- John, Wilson, (2009): *Pakistan: The Struggle Within*, New Delhi, Pearson Publisher
- Katoch, Dhruv. C, (2014): *Sectarian Divide: The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Pakistan*, Scholar Warrior, Spring 2014, retrieved from http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/717824373_DhruvCKatoch.pdf
- Khan, Sarfraz., Chaudhary, Hafeez ur Rehman, (2011): *Determinants of Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Case Study of District Jhang*, Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 8 (1): pp 237-243, 2011, retrieved from [http://www.idosi.org/mejsr/mejsr8\(1\)11/40.pdf](http://www.idosi.org/mejsr/mejsr8(1)11/40.pdf)
- Malik, Hafeez (ed) (2001): *Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities*, New York, Oxford University Press
- Misra, Ashutosh, (2008): *Pakistan: Engagement of the Extremism*, New Delhi, Shipra Publisher
- Rafiq, Arif, (2014): *Sunni Deobandi-Shi`i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007*, retrieved from <http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Arif%20Rafiq%20report.pdf>
- Rizvi, Hasan. Askari., (2000): *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, London, Macmillan Press
- Shah, Mohhammad, Nadeem, (2014): *Evolution of Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Threat to the State and Society*, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No.2, July-December 2014, pp 441-459
- Ullah, Haroon K., (2014): *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan*, New Delhi, Cambridge University Press
- Upadhyaya, Shashi. Kaushik., and S, N. Ramakant., (2001): *Contemporary Pakistan: Trends and Issue*, Delhi, Kalinga Publication
- Yusf, Huma, (2012): *Sectarian violence: Pakistan's Greatest Security Threat?*, NOREF Report, retrieved from <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21361/uploads>
- Zaman, Mohhammad, Qasim, (1998): *Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi`i and Sunni Identity*, Modern Asian Studies 32, 3 (1998), London, Cambridge University Press